Why the State Fails to Tackle Corruption : Ineffectiveness and Ambiguity of Responses by Setiyono , Budi
soc!aE
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
"+ W' fl B n' Bq;P- 
L??"t t Ag $,* q-* j : :3 \x.
addressins the srowth af








Intcrnational C*nference Boolc Series 3







SOCIALJUSTICE AND RULE OF LAW:
ADDRESSING THE GROWTH OF A PLURALIST
INDONESIAN DEMOCRACY
Copyright protected by law
All righc rcscrved No Prr[ oi this publicrtion muy bc rcproclucccl or rrunsmiLtccl in any hrm or by rny mcrns. clecrrrrnjc or
mcchrnicel, including fhotocrlPy, rccording' or rny inionrxtion srrrrrgc ancl rctricvel syslcm w irhou! pcrmission in wriring lrom
thc publishcr.
Rcqucst lor PcrmissiLrn to mekc coPicso[rny prrtol thiswork should be dircctccl to rhc publishcr. Arlclirional copicsol Llrc worl< may
l.c,'hrrrnccl lrlrn rhc puhlrslrcr
ii
SO(llAl .lt rs I l(ll: ANI) Rtrl ll Ol- l A\\'





CIVIL SOCIETY and SOCIALJUSTICE
Civil Society and Democratic Consoiidation in
Indonesia: Problems and Challenges --- ---"*
Hurriyah
Why the State Fails to Tackle Corruption:
Inef-fectiveness and Ambiguity of Responses --'- - -'----"- - -'
Budi SetiYono
The Role of NGOs, the Electoral Commission (KPU)'








In Praise of Corruption .....................'.. lll
MasonC.HoadleY





lnternational Conference Book Series
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences
Diponegoro Univenity Publisher
Address: Jl. Prof. H. Soedarro, SH
Tembalang Semarang PO BOX 1269,
Central Java, Indonesia
Phone +62-24-7465401









hr 380 pj 150 \ ?15 dnr
ISBN:9?E -979- lllT-58 -3
i
So(;lAl Jt,STICI ANI) Rtil l] OIi I A\\1
ww.s/ft &wM* |ntut$/ffi k*h+ F& p6ti !! u* Nwhw*w 4w ww &w * aw 4E 4
SOCIALJUSTICE and RELIGION
Pluralism \/ersus Islamic Orthodoxy: public Debate over Lia
Aminuddin, Founder of Salamullah Religious Cuk ...................... IBZ
AIMakin
The Pluralicy of Religious Pluralism in Indonesia:
Three Cases from CentralJava .................. 2O7
Sung-MinKim
Conceprualizing Feminisr Idenrity and Gender
Issues among Muslim Inrellectual Elices in Indonesi a ................. 249
AlimarulQibriyalt
Local Discourse and Pracrice of Women,s Leadership:
C ontemporary InterpreIation of Ko dr at p erem p uan in
Regional Press in East Kalimantan.................'. """"""""""" ' 451
LaurensBakLeer
PEOPLE IN THE MARGIN OF SOCIETY
!!
Mrw4&kqA:htl*
soclAL. lus I lc[ AND RULE OFLA\ /
4#'nffi exfrf*i$ Fd*4w$ k*t *sf *rst-Me/a4*s:4ffi *dlgtr,*
477
I
Japanese Diaspora in Indonesia ..................
EiichiHayashi







Lifting the Veil on SocialJus[ice in the Wesr Kalimantan
Border Region of Borneo ...................... ..... 335
lohanWeintrt
Decen[ralization in Indonesia: Strengthening or
WcakeningNationa1isrn.......,.-
loko Purnomo
Activating Adat:The Conrinuous Search for Righrs and
Recognition in Indonesia..............................
AdamD.Tyson
Developing Public Trusr in policymaking for a Transitional
Society: a Papua Case Study ............. ...... 43I
Theot'ransus Litaay
In and Our of the Newspapers: Ethnic Land. Claims ancl rhe
iv
SOCIALJUSTICE AND RULE OF LAW
!s{,wrus,iffi&irffi!wj*wss{,-s.,r1*l: , rr,, r.ri ,fil rnir I r:.i tf.t!jsttssanr{i$*l4ffi#M@M{r*3rs:€
CIVIt- s(X ll:l I rnd SOCIr\LJl-lSTlCF-
Why the State
Ineffectiveness
Fails to Tackle CorruPtion:
and Ambiguity of ResPonses
Budi Setiyono
Employing che kind of pun of which Indonesians are so
fond, he continued: 'politics after all is not a profession
(prot'esi), it is a rneal @orsi), and everybody is busy
getting the biggest possible share'. Consumption and
comrption are closely tinked throughout Indonesia,
where 'eating' (makan) is a popular euphemism for
corruption. 'Thegovernment's idea of workisto eatthe
people'... (Bubandt 20 O6 426)'
Soon after President Susilo BambangYudhoyono (SBY) was
inaugurated by the MPR in October 2004, he declared that
cormption eradicarion would be the first priority to be undertaken
by his administration, and he promised directly to take charge in the
battle against corTuption. Previously, all Indonesian presidents
subsequent to the reformasi era, from Habibie to Megawati' made
more or less a similar promise. Combating corn:ption has always
been a prominent public concern and heavily represented in
soclAlJUsTlcF AND RULE OF LAW
Indonesia's political rheroric. Considering that corruption is
a daily problem for every single person in Indonesia, slogans
combating it are considered compulsory mantras for gaining
political support and winning eleqtions.
Moreover, domestic demand is not the only factor that
induces presidents to promise cormption eradication. Requests for
the government to adopt anti-corruption strategies also come from
international agencies and foreign aid donors (Hamilton-Harr 2001:
66). Many of Indonesia's main donors such as the World Bank,
Uniced Nations agencies, the iMF and some bilateral donors have
installed anti-corruption packages into their aid programs. The
donors' request is not only directed to protect aid projects from the
hazards of corruption, but also to secure international investments
in Indonesia. In order to create a positive international impression,
every president has responded to rhe donors by employing ar leasr
some anti-corruption rhetoric.
Yet, the presidents have not necessarily acted on their
promises to address corruption. For example, Iess than a year after
his inauguration, when his son was gerting married on July 9,h, 2005,
President SBY threw a very luxurious wedding party by inviting
thousands of guesrs, spending billion of rupiahs, and misusing rhe
state property of the Bogor presidential palace as a party venue. In
internet discussions, residents living near the palace reported that
they saw a parade of many luxurious vehicles of guests, crearing a
massive traffic jam and disrurbing Bogor city as long as the parry
lasced. Indeed, rhe parry disgraced rhe presidenr. Hundreds of
university s[udents organized a demonstration, condemning the
President for misusing public properry for his private benefit, and
ridiculing him as a senseless culprir for having a luxurious parry
despite public poverty (B aliP ost, iO/07/ 2005).For more than a month,
thc mcclia.suspected the President of misusingbudget andpublic
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facilities to finance the party. The bride and groom were also
rcported to have received a number of very expensive presents from
bureaucrats, politicians and businesspeople suspected and
convicted of cormption. The President denied the allegations by
saying that all costs of his party were covered from his own pocket,
promising that all luxurious presenEs would be rerurned to the
benefactors, but no verification of this statement was provided by
any insdrudon. Some commentators in the media said that the party
damaged the President's credibility in seriously fighting comrption
(Komp as, 11 / 07 /200 5 ;T anp oinw 
^ktif 
, I0 / 07 / 200 5).
This case is largely anecdotal, and relies on media reports. But
it does illustrate rypical power holders' behavior in the current
Indonesian polirical siruadon. The anti-comrpcion promises and
programs begin propitiously, but in practice they disappoint. Why
has the commicment of various presidents to cleaning-up
government been so weakwhen they needbroadpopular support for
theirpolitical survival? The mainreasonforthe failure is the absence
of a working accountabiliry system, making presidents subject to
the risk of appearing inconsistent. In particular, the failure is a
product of weak supervision from the juficial insticutions and the
parliament. In fact, the judicial insticutions and the parliament are
also heavily infected by corrupt practices. As will be discussed later,
the judicial instirutions even take advantage of cormption
investigarions for taking bribes, while parliamentary members use
their supervisory power for gaining illicit kick backs and
accordingly would not allow themselves to be targeted by anti-
comrptionmeasures.
The reason for the state's failure, howevet, is not only the
ambiguous attirude of presidents. Even if they had a real intention to
deal with comrption, their initiatives would have encountered a
number of substantial obstacles. First of all, giventhefact that the
::,:',i1,,'L::,ll:":.1|:,.1;::.x:T.,x,,.,,,,,,, , . ,:i;,,,:,sR,i1,i,s{,xjii,i{ji1,:i3,ri:.s3r!:,!i*
transitional democraric cabinets are basically coalition
governments, presiden[s have had limited capacity to impose their
programs on their ministers and senior bureaucratd (Davidson,
Juwono, and Timberman 2006: l-2).'The ministers tend to serve
their party's interests, which do not always favor the anti-
corruption agenda. Secondly, taking into account that thepotential
risk is highest for political, econornic and bureaucratic power-
holders to suffer losses, all anti-cormption initiatives have had to
compromise with borh old and new vested interesrs (World Bank
2003c: 14). In other words, political compromise overrides the rure of
law. Thirdly, with the transfer of more authority to regional
governments, the central government has encountered difficulties in
implementing anti-corruption measures in a more decentralized
political strucure (see for example, Djogo {a Syam 2003).
This chapter analyses the ineffective and ambiguous
responses and behavior of the state to the problem of cormption in
Indonesia. It locates the ineffectiveness of state actions to stop the
problem of corruptionin the broaderpoiitical context of democratic
consolidation. The chapter thus highlighrs the key characreristics of
thepolitical environment in rhe battle against comrption during the
democratic transition in Indonesia.
Government Anti-cormption Initiatives
Cormption is a cenrral political issue for Indonesian politics
(see Tabie 1). Since rhe collapse of rhe Suharto regime and despite the
reformulation of political insriturions and rhe strengthening of
formal accountabiJiry mechanisms, cormption persists in
' For example, susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (slly)'s administration in 2004-2009
was a product of a coalition between eight political parties. SBy's part5z, the
Democrat Party, only had 10olo ofthe seats in thc nirtional parliament. As thi leader of
a small party, SBY needs to serve thc intcrcsts ol'his alliance partners in order to
maintain political stability.
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Indonesian (Davidson,Juwono [s Timberman 2006: l4). This
siruation has forced the state, the executive branch in particular, to
take initiarives -or be seen to take initiatives - to deal with the
problem. The following section summarizes the cornrption
cradication measures taken during each Indonesian president's
adminisrration since the ret'ormasi era.
Table l: Comrption remains a problem: Indonesia's CPI records
Aalucfrh pdiod t,rltqd(pdtod
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* Note: .CpI (Cormption perceprion Index) score indicates the degtee of public sector
comrption as perceived by business people and country analysts, and ranges befween l0
(highly clean) and 0 (righly corn:pt)' source: Annual comrption perceptions surveys of
I ransparency Intemational (www.rransparency.org).
' lheBurharruddinJusuf H abibie Administr ation (199 I - 1999)
I)uring Habibie's presidency the government developed some
important policies to address corn:ption, including:'
I removing government restrictions on the media. The
Iiberation of the media enabled journalists to scrutinize
the government and investigate any form of abuse of
power;
r initiating a new anti-corruption law (no. 3V1999) that
introduced tough penalties for cormption (up to 20 years
injail orup to Rp I billion in fines);
' In a broader contex! despite some scandals during his administration, Habibie was
admired by some commentato.s forundertaking a number of reforms that have been
t undamenial for Indonesia's democratic transition (scc for cxample Bourchier 2000).
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I discontinuing govemmcnt intervention over the State
' Auditor Agency (BPK). With the BpK no longer
subordinate to the govemmenq it can release annual
figures of its audits that show evidence of the scale of
corruption and losses to the state budget.
The Ab dur r ahmanw ahid, Admini s tr ation (19 9 9 -2001)
The anti-corruprion policies during Wahid's adminisrration
included:
I rernoving restraints on civil associations and the press,
including abolishing repressive bodies rhar were believed
to have restrained civil organizations such as the
Department of Information;
issuing Presidential Decree (KEPPRES) no. 4412000 on
the establishment of the Commission of National
Ombudsmen (KON). The instirution, which consists of ll
elected commissioners, was authorized to monitor and
scrutinize public complainrs regarding the work of public
instirutions;
forming the National Law Commission (KHN)"
represented by both government officials and civil sociery
actors. The commission targeted the improvement of the
court system by making some revisions in the judiciary.
Under this reform, judges on the Supreme Court have ro
pass a fit and proper test screening from the DPR that
examines their personal integrity and legal knowledge;
improving the performance of commercial courts by
appointing ad hoc judgcs from outside rhe regular
judiciarysystem;
establishing theJoi n r'l'cu rr r lir r ( .orru prion Erafication
Ctvll s(I Ilrl Y rnd SOCIALJUSTICE"rcffi
and manage the efforts for conuption eradicarion' As will
be explained further in the following chapter, the Team
was assigned to deal with sophisticated comrpEion cases
that requhedahighdegree of verificarion' To this end, the
Team was formed comprising members from multi-
sectoral backgrounds, representing the police, auditors,
academics, prosecutors, Bank Indonesia officers and CSO
acrivists;3
I issuing KEPPRES no. 18/2000 on the Procedure of
Government Procurement- The Decree, which was then
revised by Decree no. 80/2003, obliges transparency for
the procurement process- This regulation stipulates that
every such procurement should be conducted in a process
of fair and cransParent bidding;
r formingtheCommissionforlnvestigationoftheWealth
, The members ofTGPTPK are as follows: chairman: AdiAndojo soetjipto (retired
Supreme Justice), vice chairman: Tigor Pangaribuan (public Pro!:cutor/A9o),
ge'ndarman Suiandji (public prosecutor/Aco), I Made- Yasa (public
prosecutor/AG0), rarctran Sunjoto (public prosecutor/AGo), SJ. Sup.. _Indado
ifofi"" Officer), Sr. Sup. Fadjar Istijono (Police Offrcer), Sr' !p'Murawi.Effendi
inof"" Omc6i), Mo|ammad Hidijono (government offioer/Financial and
bevelopment Supervisory Board-BPKP), Harditya- f4g1lg- (govemment
offrciFinancial-and Development supervisory Board-BPKP), Muhamrnad Ali
Tarmizi (govemment officer/Bank Indonesia), Suryohadi Djulianto (govemment
officer/Dir Gen. ofTaxation), Nasiruddin Lubis (government officer/l.lational Land
AffairsAgency), HamidAwaludin (govemment offrcer/university), P.B. Trenggono
lgovernm--ent 
-oilicerfivlinistry of State Apparatus), Itk*dT Sonhadji (civil
s"ociety/Indonesian Corruption Watch--ICW), Faisal Tadjuddin (civil
societyA.{ational Wealth Rescue Movement--Gempita), Hamid Chalid (civil
society/tndooesian Society for Transparency-MTl), eg*g Adiasa- (civil
socieiy/Indonesian Accountants Association-IAl), Satjipto _ Rahardjo
(academics/legal expert), Retnowulan sutantio (civil societylretired supreme
iustice), U.ff]SitaUin (civil society/retired public prosecutor), H.S Dillon (civil
societi4.{ational Commission of Human Rights), Krissantono (civil
society/researcher), Pradjoto (civil society/banking lawyer)'
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of Srare Officials (KpKf,N). l hc commissiot was assigned Lo
audit the assets o[ srarc officials, poliricians orral**ig"u.
T'he members of trrc cor'mission inclu*ed 3t pers.ns that
mainly represenr political parry and CSOs; and
I formulating Lawno. 15/2002 on anci-moneylaundering.
Apart from these measures, Ilresident W.ahid a-[so ap1>ointec{
Baharudin Lopa, who was reputably known as a clean prosecutor, robe the Minister of Legal Aflfairs and rbe' Attorney Generar. uncler
Lopa's leaders'ip and with support from TGFTpK, [he aftorney was
successful in revealing some comrpdon cases and bringing some bigcorrupt actors tojustice.
The Megaw ati S ukar no ptttr i A dmin i st r a fi on (200 J - 200 4)
similar to her precrecessor, Megawati promisecl that conrbaring
comrption w.uld be a priority of her presidenriar agencla and she
arrracred pubric atrention when she gathered her family members acouple of days after the i'auguratior, 
"rkir,g 
them to ,ro, .rrgng" ,r,any kind of KKN Following her promise to eliminare KKN,
Megawari irritiated several policies, irr.lrrdirrg,
signing the establishmenr of the Cenrre for Financial
Transacrions Repr:rting anci Analyses (ppATK),
fcrllowing the enactnrent of Law no. 1SIZOOZ on And-
Money La,ndering during wahici's acradnistrarion" The
instirudon was mainly assigned to track the flow of the
mr:ney from any suspicious transaction and to investigate
assets involved in cornrpt actir.iries;
signing Larv no. 3o/2oo2on And -crxrupdon, fo[owecl bythe establishmenr of the Corr,rption Eraclication
Commission (KpK) ancl rhc Spccial Court for Comrpdon
(SCC) on 2ZDecernber 2002;
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I signing Law no. 22l2OO4 on Judicial Commission,
followed by the formation of the Judicial Commission,
which is assigned to oversee the performance of judges.
'f heSusiloBambangYudhoyono(SBY)AdminrstrationQ}}4'presatt)
During election campaigning for the 2004 presidenrial elecrion, SBY
declared that he would prioritize eradication of KKN and that he
would handle anti-comrption accions with 'his own hands'
(Tempointerakrrt, 7fi9/20o4).' Following his promise, SBY's
administration took a number of acrions addressing corruption,
suchas:
I issuing Presidential Instruclion (INPRES) no. 5/2004 on
the Acceleration of Cormption Eradication, followed by
the Declararion of a National Action Plan for Comrption
Eradication;'
r issuingKEPPRES no. I712OO4 fortheestablishmentofthe
National Police Commission (Kompolnas).
The commission is assigned to supervise and monitor the
performance of the police, and also recommends
o SBYs promise attracted Indonesian voters and he won grore than 607o of the vote
for the presidency in the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections. Corresponding to this
issue, a survey of a Global Comrption Baxometer conducted by Transparency
International following the victory of SBY pointed out that 8 I % of its respondents
believedthat com4tion will decrease'alot'or'a little'overthenextthree years.
' Tte DrIPRES contains seven general insfuctions to all institutions and government
officers, and special assignments to a number ofMinisters. The general instnrctions
require all state officials to: (l) immediately submit wealth reports to the KPII (2)
create performance criteria, including standardization, transpaxency on fees for
services and licences, elimination ofillegal fees, and create islands ofintegrity; (3)
imFlement presidential decree no. 80/2003 on govemment procurement; (4)
simplifi governmental affairs andpersonal lifestyles; (5) provide maximum support
to the prosecution of comrption cases by POLRI, Attomey General, and KPK; (6)
cooperate with the KPK to administrative system may provoke or are susceptible to
comrption; and(7) increase supervision inorderto curb comrption.
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candidates for Chicfof PoIicc ro rl-represidenq
issuing KEPPRFS no. I B/20t14 for rhe establishment of rhe
Prosecutor Commission (Komisi Kejaksaan).
The Commission is assigned ro supervise and monitor the
performancc of public p rosccutors;
delivering special assignments to some Ministers to take
anti-corruption actions, among others: (1) instructing the
Head of Bappenas to prepare a National Action plan for
Corruption Erafication for 2OO4-2O09; (2) requiring the
Minister of Law and Human Rights to draft laws and
other implementing regulations to combat corruption;
(3) commanding rhe Atrorney General and Chief of
POLRI to maximize investigarions and prosecurions of
corruption, return corrup[ed state monies, and punish
the abuse of power by rheir personnel; and (4) insrructing
the Minister of Education and Srate Minister for
Communications and Informarion ro develop anti-
corruption curricula and education campaigns;
issuing KEPPRES no- 11/2005 for creating an inrer-agency
'Anti-Corruprion Task Force Team' (Timtas Tipikor) in
May 2005. The team has a special mandate to accelerate
the investigation and prosecution of big corrup[ion cases
in governmental agencies including state-owned
Enterprises (SOEs);
signing the formulation of rhe Law of Wirness prorection,
which was rhen enacred by the DpR in l8July 2006. The
enactment of the law was aimed at encouraging the
witnesses of a crime freely ro furnish resdmony
concerning a criminal cleecl rhat they saw and or
experienced wirhour tal<ing irrro account any threat on
theirlives. The law conr plcrccl tlrc sct of comprehensive
CMl. S(Xlltr IY and SOCIALJUSTICE
regulations for the government to combat corruption.
Why didn't government initiatives vrork?
Although many policies have been issued by tlae current (and all
previous) governments, collecrively they are not very effective and
have made litde improvement in dealing with com:ption. This
sectionexplainswhy.
Presidents' lack of commitrnent
In analyzing the myths and realities of governance ancl
cormption, Kaufmann (2005) points out that in many new
democraric countries, whilst corruption eradication in general has
become the most prominent issue articulated by the people, it does
not always turn into a serious concern for the governmenE to uphotrd
'accountabiliry. Rather, the issue is frequendy raised merely as
political rhetoric to gain public sympathy or even as a polieicat
instrument with which to attack competitors. Similarly, Klitgaard
(1988: 4) maintains, 'Sometimes anri-comrption efforts are pursued
only half-heartedly... anri-comrptrion efforts themselves become
corrupt efforts to vilify or imprison the opposition"..' Since serving
only as politically expedient ways to react to the pressune Eo 'do
something' about comrption, the anti-cormption initiatives usuaj.ly
appear to have litde impact (Kaufrnann 2005: 88). trn shont" while
governme4t policies to combat corruBtion appear to be
unadulterated and assertive, they have been i-nconsiscene and half-
heartedatbest.
As in other countries, presidents of tha newly democrati.c
lndonesia tend to be inconsistent in deali n g w i r li c o rrnupdon. [n" fact,
I
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although presidents articulare the importance of corruption
eradication, all of rhem have faced allcgarions of their involvemenr in
comrption cases or engagemenr in corrupt behavior. Eachpresident
has become entangled in scandal:us pracrices that have undermined
muchof the anti-corruption agendas that rheyinitiated.
President Habibie, for instance, despire proposing some
anti-comrption programs, recorded a disgraceful case which. came
to be called the 'Bank Bali scandal.' Although rhe scanclal may or may
not have direcdy involved rhe President, it did definitery involve a
number of his aides. The scandal originated from a pressing craims
agreement between Sarya Novanto, director of pT. EGp (Era Giat
Prima) and the Bank Bali in 1999, which conrained some suspicious
arrangements.6 Some analysts speculated that the deal was
manipulated by l{abibie's parrons for raking illegal gains. The media
reported that the disbursement that had been received by pT. EGp
passed to a n"umber of people close to Habibie,s inner circle, It was
rumored the funds were collected for rhe purpose of financing
Flabibie s campaign for the 1999 presidential election. Habibie dicl
o At the time, Bank Bali ordered pr, EGB to recover Bank Bali's claims on several
!gS+*:ty BTA @ank TiaraAsia), BDNI (Bank Dagang Negara Indonesia), andBUN (Bank umum Nasional). However, since the banks lave-been liquidated by
Indonesia's central Bank, all of the claims were taken over by riPPN 1rt"Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency). Accordingly, pr. EGp had to ...orr"i th.
credits from BPPN, which were worth up to Rp. soe biltion. The agreement between
PT. EGP and Bank Bali was judged by many to raise suspicionsl First, a question
arose conceming why the credits had to be retrieved through a third party (pr. ucny,
while essentially Bank Bali could retrieve its credits dirJctly aom tt e dppN. rne
position of the PT EGP as a third party was considered unnecessary since the BppN
intended to release the credits._secondly, while the ugreemeni seemed a pure
economic transaction, some believed that it was politically motivated. Satya
Novanto was a vice treasurer of Golkar and known to be close to Habibie's circie.
Finally, the commission that has been paid to pr. EGp was considered too high. The
company received around Rp. 546 billion (almost 60% of the total amourrlof the
credits).
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Although having a reformist reputation, Abdurrahman
wahid,s attempts to combat com:ption were also undermined by
his record of providing unclear explanations on the Bulog and the
Brunei scandal.t Althougtr the allegations were denied by the
president, testimonies from wirnesses to a DPR committee gave the
president no place ro escape (Kompas, 2gllll2ooo). In addition,
President Wahid was also embarrassed by the appointment of his
brorher, Hasyim wahid, for a position as a debt collector to BPPN
(The Indonesian Bank Restnrcruring Agency, IBRA) without the
proper procedure. The appoinrment provoked criticism since the
President did not make the appointment accessible to the pubJic for
about five months, which led to the resignation of Hasyim Wahid
from his position (Gatra, lVl0/2000).
As noted above, President Megawati made very promising
actions ro combar cormption in the early stages of her presidency. In
rhe last episode of herpresidency, however, Megawari also suffered
from criricism related to her family's business interests. In fact, the
pafterns of the way Megawari's family business operated were
reported as being identical to the patterns maintainedby the former ,
President Suhano (Aditjondro 2001).' Student demonsrrators called
the President Megawati Suhartoputri,' or daughter of Suharto,
o The Bulog scandal refers to a peculiar transfer of Rp 35 billion from a foundation
**oriut"a iitt Bulog - the stati logistics agency, to those who are suspected to be
the Wahid's close asiciates, while-the Brunei scandal refers to the allegation that
Gus Dur received an emergency aid fund from the Sultan ofBrunei in his capacity of
a president but he used tne tt"a for private purposes (Hamilton-Hart 20Ol:. 74;
Hadiwinata: 2003 : 260).
' The Bulog scandal refers to a peculiar transfer of Rp 35 billion from a foundation
associated ftth Bulog -t the stati logistics agency, to those who are suspected to be
the Wahid's close associates, while-the Brunei scandal refers to the allegation that
Gus Dur received an emergency aid fund from the sultan of Brunei in his capacity of
a fresident but he used tle fund for private purposes (Hamilton-Hart 2oolt 74;
Hadiwinata: 2003 : 260).
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accusing the President of failing to carry our reforms to
combat KKN and of making no change si'ce the former president,s
autocraric rule endedin 1998 (BBCNew s,23/07/2002). within her own
parry, Megawati also faced opposition regarding her policy in
dealing with KKN. Three pDI-p assembly members resigned to
protest her policy and behavior in the second year of her presidency.
Mochtar Buchori, a PDI-p member of parliament and former adviser
to Megawati described her as 'aurhoritarian and aloof', similar co the
way he used to describe Presidenr suharto (BBC News ,23i07 /2002) .
Like his predecessors, SBy's actions to combat corruption
also have been damaged by a number of allegations of rotten behavior
and poiicies that contradict cormption erad"ication efforts.
currendy, in 2010 the President is also under serious allegation of
being involved in the Bank cenrury scandal'n, a siruarion that is
roughly similar to rhe 'Bank Bali'o and the Bank I iFpo scandal'." Also,
during his presidency sBY has been considered too soft in dealing
with comrption suspects and those who have been found. guilry. The
most controversial issue in this respectis the decision to discontinue
the investigation of cormption cases involving seven foundations
t 
These included for example, privileged consideration on govemment licences andprojects, profitahle distribution and supply transact6ns with state-owned
gnterlrisgsa.lnd-a1so acquisitions of state asseis and companies under BppN (Koran
Tempo, l8/ol/2o02; sriwijayl post, 03/08/2003; pontianal< post, 04/il/)003).
Megawati's husband, liufiq.Ke-m1s, for example, despite being hee f.orr, *y
concrete charges, was reportedto be involved in awiderange ofgov'ernment projects
tainted with c,omrption, including the $2.3 billion Jakarta -outeiRing noaa ircinnlproject, the $2.4 billion double-track railway project from Meraf west iuuu to
B.anyuwangi of East Java, the $23 billion trans-kuii-*tun highway, ana tle $t.zbillion trans-Papua highway (Asia Times, l7/og/zooz). Taufiq-also [,"n*nt"o to*
being appointed as a 'govemment envoy' in charge ofiforeign'invern""ni pro:""tr,
whict attracted intense public criticism. ln tcrmi of declar-ed wealth, vr"lai"ati,s
tuTilv_yr-.,"_?9rted among.the richcst of thc poritical clitc. Their weat6 craimed up
to Rp 59 8 billion ($5.98 million) in a marrdaiory clcclaration of wealth to tr," a"art




belonging ro former President suharto. Aithough the government
stated that the termination was purely 'humanitarian' based,
allegacions continue that the President has poiitical and economical
deals wirh suharto family members (Jakarta Post, 1210412006).
Further, sBY's actions have been criticized for over-emphasizing
investigation ancl prosecution, without resolute implementation'
Alrhough a number of cases have been resolved by the court, some of
the convictions were not executed for a long period' For instance' as
iCW. (2006) pointed out, in 2006 at least 46 cases were resolved by
the Supreme Court bur not executed by the ACtorney General."
Some ongoing investiga[ions a]so show little progress' Ironically'
during the sBY presidency a number of suspects and those convicte d
of corruption escaped punishment (ICW 2006)''o Finally' the
The scandal that is also known as 'Centurygate'was a takeover of Bank Century by
the Deposit Insurance Agency (LPS) and a series of rnassive injections of state funds
i"Lliir*""a;ng, totattig Rp k 7 trillion ($7,00 million) after the Bankwas declared
irrof"!", by thJiinanciaT Sictor Stability Committee (KSSK), which was led by
Fi'ance Minister Sri Mulyani and includld then BI Governor now vice president
B;"dr;"". Suspicion revoives around the massive drain on state funds involved, and
a.o irf-t"tf-r"t rome depositors had preferential treatment or access to their funds after
ttl"Uultootmoneyhadbeeninjected,andwhethersomeofthemoneywasdiverted
and e mbezzled for SBY's presidential campaign'
'n The 'Bank Bali scandal' originated from a pressing claims agreement between
satya Novanto, director of pT:EGp (Era Giatprima) and.the Bank Bali in, 1999,
which contained some suspicious amangements' Some analysts speculated that 
the
Jeal was the manipulation by ,orn" piople for taking illegal gains' The media
reported that the distursementihat hadLeen received bv.PT lclp^ttt,t i:^Tb*
olSp*pi".fo." to Habibie's inner circle. It was rumo.red the funds were collected for
if,Jp".p"r".f nnancing Habibie's campaign for the 1999 presidential election.
" Tire 'bank Lippo ,"undul' refers to a iase when PDIP party was reported to receive
np ioo u;ui"" iron] tt 
" 
Lippo Group. public rumour pointed out that the motivation
for giving donations was to obtain piotection from the PDIP that won the election 
in
iSS! urri*oo'ld govern the co'ntry against cfforts to expose crimes related to the
group in thepast (Tekad,30/08/1 999).
', The decision was made under Attomey Gcncral's decision to issue a letter of
terminationonprosecution(SrrratKetetapanPcnglrcnliat]PenuntutanPerkara)no.




president is also considered to promote 'informal settlements, in
resolving corruption cases, which may porentially make anti-
corruption laws redundanr (Kompa s, 2g I I2l 2OO7).
Overall, no president has li'ed up to their srated anti-
corruption policies. on the one hand, they have tended to show
prompr and severe responses to corruption in order to make a good
public impression.'' on rhe other hand, their behavior conrrad.icrs
the policies they initiared. As will be discussed larer, they also
rended to be lenient wirh the 'fat cars' who have strong political and
economic power in order ro get financial support or avoid political
retaliation' unavoidably, rhis approach has led ro rhe public
impression thar the presidents have been selecdve in rreating
corruption cases and drive an an[i-corruption agend,a 
'ainly forpolitical inreresrs rarher than for upholding accounrability (TII
2006).'u Ir is nor surprising, rherefore, rhat Indonesian public
opinion toward the governmencs' approach to dealing with
corruption fluctuares between hope and cynicism (Davidson,
Juwono & Timberman 2006: l5).
'' The cases include the case of 33 members of DpRD ofwest Sumatera province, the
case of 10 former members. of DpRD of cirebon city, both for the alleg'eJoi-iiur"
of regional govemment budgets for self-enrichmentjand 3 forrner boari m"*u"., otAPHI llndonesian Forestry Association) fior the alreged ol rnisuse orrelorestalion
funds. According to ICW, for more than i year, those cases were not executed by the
Attorney Generai and no clear explanationias 6een given.
'o According to ICW's records, ai least ten convicted of comrption fled in 200 612007 ,including the director ofTexmaco group Marimutu Sinivasan who n"Ji" ii.g"p.r"
on 15 March 2006. He has been prosecuted for ernbezzring Rp 20 bilrion oi;;i;."
!a1* \tyamllat. Similarly, the former director of Srate-Oii Company p";;;i".
Tabrani Ismail, convicted for six years imprison on 26 April 2006, also fleJon 15
September2006 before the prosecutors couid cxccutc thc pirnishment.'' For example' as shown in appendix 6, thc attcr'pt to bring Suharto to justice
represents the ambivalence of all presidcnts irr handliirg ..rrrupt-ion. They generally
take action only when public pressure is strorrg 
^rrtr 
thc pirriticar risk is smail]
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Political parties' ill i cit gains
Manybelieve that the inconsistency of presidents in dealing
with comrption also relates to the fact that allpolitical parties, from
which the presidents gain their political affiliarion, are financially
hungry and prone to exploiting public funds. The increasing
comperition among political parries following democratizacion has
made their operations financially demanding." Since political
parties generally have not deveioped any independent financial
capacity," the high cost of political comperition makes it necessary
for the parties to find external sources of revenue by orploiting
legislative and executive instirutions, and selling the nominarions
for public office to affluent non-party figures, as well as positioning
SOEs as cash cows through taking advantage of weak accountability
mechanisms (Cole 2001: 16; Mietzner 2OO7). Each political parry
wants to dominate sftategic positions inthe newpoliticallandscape
in order to make it possible to steal public money. Many policicians,
both in the executive or legislarure, have often at once acted as both
tu This is visible, for example, in the case of comrption ofKPU mernbers where all
the suspects, Daan Dimara, Mulyana Kusumah, and Nazaruddin Syamsuddin were
instantly executed soon after the issuance ofthe court verdict; yet in the cases of
comrption of BLBI gate and some strong political leaders, the execution is usually
slow(ICW2008: l9).
" As international experience proves, democratisation increases political
competition, and provides incentives for political groups and individuals to attain or
preserve power. The competition eventually encourages political elites to take illegal
ievenue andevade official channels inpursuitoftheirgoals (Moran2o0l:319-393).tt It is important to note that Indonesian political parties mostly represent the interest
ofpolitical elites, and do not have traditions to orgqnise dues from memberships. For
example, Golkar was dominated by Suharto as his political machine, Indonesia
Democratic Party Stnrggle (PDp) was established and dominated by Megawati,
National Mandate Party (PAN) byAmien Rais, NationalAwakening Party (PKB) by
Gus Dur, Moon and Crescent Party (PBB) by Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Democrat Party
(PD) bV Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Hanura Party by General Wiranto and
Gerindraby General Prabowo Subianto.
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'broker' and 'bloodsucker rn their position, taking illicir kickbacks
fromthe procurement of goods andpublic services inorder ro cashin
for their parties' benefirs. speaking about the characteristics of
political parties in rhe Indonesian democraric transirion, Robison 6s
lJ:adiz (2004:228) maintain thar:
...most of these parties are not 'natural, political entities,
carrying out 'aggregating' and 'articulating, functions, but
constitute tactical alliances that variously draw on the same
pool of predarory interests. Notwithsranding certain
ideological schisms rvirhin and berween pafties, their function
has primarily been to act as a vehicle to contest access to the
spoilsof statepower.
Such situations make checks and balances between
competing parties dilficult to function. When making errors, rulers
in an ideal democraric setting should be subjects of correcrion from
opposition or parties that are nor in power. Such a kind of
arrzrngement, however, has not taken place during the democratic
transition in Indonesia. With the possible exceprion of the
conservativeJustice and welfare Parry (PKS), all political parries in
Indonesia arecorrupt sogovernment attempts to combat comrption
have the risk of endangering their own parry. Similarly, opposition
parties do not seriously want to push the government to rackle
corruption, since such attempts may damage their own political
interests. In orher words, the competing groups direcr their
competition more towards the capture of the state and its resources
for political redistribution rhan to poLicics that benefit rhe people
generally (Sebastian & Williams 2002: ,50). As noted earlier, Golkar
forexample, couldnot escape from thc allcgat i.n o[cormption in the
72
CIML SOCIETY Md SOCIALJUSNCF
Bank Bali scandal. No Golkar officials tried to legally refute the
allegations. However, the scandal turned into a political issue for
attacking political opponents rather than an oPporruniry to uphold
accountabiliry and the rule of law. The scandal was used by PDIP -
the strongesr Golkar comperitor in the 1999 elections - to attack
Golkar.'n After the 1999 election, however, PDIP fiscontinued its
enqulry into the case. some speculated that this happened because
PDIP was involved in a sirnilar scandal, the 'Lippo Bank scandal'
(Tekad 30/0 8/1999). The parry was reported to have received Rp 500
billion from the Lippo Group. Public rumor pointed out that the
motivation for giving donations was to obtain proteccion ftom the
polirical party that won the election and would govern the country
against efforts to expose crimes related to the group in the past
(Tekad 30/08/1999). Not surprisingly, PDIP did not exhibit a
willingness ro conrinue the inquiry into the Bank Bali scandal as
other political parties have requested a similar investigation into the
UppoBankscandal.
In addition, all parties tend to rely on the donations of
individual conglomerates and companies in refurn for favorable
policies. While several conglomerates and business persons were
involvedwithcriminal comrprion, especially during the New order
era, all political parties maintained good relations in order to obtain
the necessary finanpial assistance. Although regularions on party
financing exist, violarions without punishment have been a very
common practice (Hadiwinata 2006: 106).'o
'o This relates to the political situation at the time, when the rivalrybetween Go^lkar
against PDIP and its supporters was intensiffing. For PDIB the disclosure of the
B"ank Bali scandal was a golden opportunity for attacking the reprrtation of Go|<ar
and its presidential candidate 6ffa6iUie;. PDIP gained a political bq9fit whel-theV
aamaged ttabibie's credibility before the presidential clcction in MPR assembly in
SOCIAIJUSTICE AND RUI.E OF LAW
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The implication of the reciprocal dependency berween
conglomerates and political parties is clear: presidents often handle
cormptionbytaking a soft andinformal approach, especially against
cases that involved benefactors (or prospective benefactors) of the
governments' party. Presidents or their inner-circle are used to being
criticized for dining with suspects of comrption to discuss their
cases, rather than using tight law enforcement to resolve the cases. In
other instances, governments make benevolent policies to protect
their business parrners from legal punishment. This is shown, for
example, in the relationship becween president Abdurrahman
Wahid with people accused of involvemenr in corruption. As the
mefia reported, the President met Tommy Suharto soon after
suharto's son had been senrenced to jail. Despite his deniar, one of
Tommy's lawyers confirmed that in early October 2000 the
President met secrerly with Tommy for ,family purposes,
(Republika, 3V[/2000; Tempointeraktif, 30/ltl2000). But many
people believed they met ro discuss the possibility of ciemency for
Tommy in exchange for confiscation of some suharto family assets
(Hamilton-Hart 2O0l: 76).
In a more or less similar vein, president Megawati made
policies that favored the perpetrators of BLBI. Megawati creared
INPRES no. 8/2002 on the Release and Discharge to exempr BLBI
' to ok9 an example, Tekad tabloid (30/o9/rggg) reported rhat in 1999 pDIp
received donations from a nuTbel oftop conglomerates, including salim group for
Rp 100 billion, Mercu Buana Rp 50 billion, Barito Group 50 billioi, Gudaig Garam
Rp 50 billion and Jarum Kudus Rp 50 billion. The party also received biilions of
donations from a number of individuals known to be involved in the BLBi case,
Tqlud,lg Srrdono Salim, Mocbtar Riady, Anthony Salim, prayogo pangestu, James
T. Riady and two children of former president suharto, rutui aia sigit. If correct,
tiese do-natio-ns are clearly a violation, bccause according to the law]donations to
parties should be at most Rp l5 million fiom indivirluals aid at most ip 150 million
from groups. Ifproven, the PDIp should bc disqualilicd, and ofcourse'the results of
the 1999 electionannulled. However, no action has bccn taken to clariffthisreport.
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creditors from legal claims to restore the money if they
cooperarecl and rerurned their debt. Because of the iNPRES, the
Attorney General in some instances terminated investigation of
outstandjx g debtors considered' cooperative"
President SBY followed the same pattern, issuing a Minister of
Finance Decree no. l5l/I(MK.O1/2006. Based on these regulations,
Attorney GeneraiAbdulrevoked the BI-BI cases withthereason that
it was in the public interest. In addition' on 6 February 2006 SBY
received three outstanding debtors of BLBI in his office, which later
on generated much public criticism." In the meeting at the
Presidential Pe[ace, the outstanding debtors scated they were
willing ro resrore their debt in the BLBI case that was valued at
hunclrecls of billions of rupiah, aslong as theywerefreefrom anylegal
claim. Their efforts were futile, because on 17 March 2006 the
government issued a policy that evenEually relieved from legal
prosecution the recipient of eight outstanding BLBI debtors
(including the debrors who came ro rhe palace) if they paid off all
their debts by the end of 2006.
The weakness ofjudicial institutions
Apart from problems of the executive branch, the
ineffectiveness of the state'slttempts to combat corruptionhas also
been causedby theweakness ofiuficialinstirutions. Besides their
,t At the time, the three BLBI outstanding debtors, namely James Januardi-owner of
Bank l-autan Berlian Ulung Rrtrsa, Lukman Astanto - owner of Bank Namura, and
Atang Latief-representative ofshareholders in Bank Rira, were reported to visitthe
palaci accompuoied t,ro senior police oflicers (Chicl'Deputy of National Police
betective and Deputy Director of Econornic Crirnc) who logically should have
arrested tlrem (Detiknews, 13 I 0212006).
t"X#*iffi 
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Iack of independence, the judicial insrirutions are also corrupr
and constrained by poor capacicy and resources.
Judicial institutions frequenrly do nor mainrain an
independent attitude in dealing with corruption and allowing
intervention by the execurive branch, especially by the president.
owing to the inrerest in protecting rheir business clients, presidents
have intervenedin rhe judicial systemwhen the judiciarywanted Eo
tackle corruption cases committed by their patrons. Such
intervention is possible, since despite the amendments to the
constitution granring greater independence ro rhe judiciary, it still
allows for considerable government influence (Lindsey 2OO2a:
280-l). President Abdurrahman Wahid, for example, once ordered
the attorney general ro suspend the progress of legal proceedings
against three heavily indebted rycoons on rhe BLBI case: Marimuru
Sinivasan, Prajogo Pangesru and Syamsui Nursalim. Legal acrion
against them was to proceed only if they failed to repay their debts to
the government within eighr years Q akartap ost,27 IIO I 2OOO).
President SBY also made a similar intervention when on 12
May 2006 his government decided ro srop prosecurors from
proceeding with legal acrion against seven of Suharro,s
foundations." The Coordinating Minister of Law and Defense
announced that rhe decision made was based on humanitarian
considerations, since suharto was regarded as permanently ill (suara
Pembaruan, 12/0512006). The governmenr requested rhe Attorney
General issue a Letter of Prosecution Suspension (SKp3) which
ensured that the seven cases of corruption in the foundations would
not be sent to trial,
For severalreasons, thejudicial systemitsdf has not become a
reliable or coherent instrument for fighting com:ption (Hamilton-
Hart 20Ol: 76). First, the legal system srill remains subject to serious
allegations concerning the 'court mafia', a term referring to illicit
arrangements between police, lawyers, prosecutors, and judges to
generate benefits from any legal case. There are several cases which
indicate that the 'courE mafia' operates strongly in the Indonesian
judicial system. For example, on 3 January 2006 a court clerk of
South Jakarta district court was arrested by the Anti-Cormption
Task Force Team (Timtas Tipikor) for extorting a wifness of
comrption on the PTJamsostek case," which was still under rrial in
the disrrict courr. The clerk was caught red-handed when he asked
for Rp 200 million in exchange for reducing the possible
punishment. In the investigation, he stated that he had been ordered
by a judge handling the case (Sinar H drdpdrl, 2VoV2oo6).'o Moreover,
anecdotal evidence and tesrimonies from comrption case suspects
suggest that during cormption investigations, police and prosecutor
tended to treat them as an 'ATM (automatic teller machine)' that has
3 PT. Jamsostek is a state owned enterprise (SOE) that possesses monopoly rights
for controlling workers' insurance funds. It is widely known that the company
maintains an opaque management for the interests of its bosses and is a 'cash cow' for
goyemment offrcials and politicians (Tempointeraktit, ll/01/2006). Despite many
allegations concerningpossible comrptioninthe company, onlyafewinstanceshave
been revealed and prosecuted. One of tle prominent cases was comrption in the
Medium Term Notes (MTl$ whereby the SOE invested its funds on Bank Global in
May-June 2003. It was revealed in court tQat apparently there was manipulation of
the feasibility assessment of the investnrent that led to a state loss of Rp' 311.085
billion (SinarHarapan, l9/O4/2006).The case has incriminated the General Director
Ahmad Djunaidi and the Invesfinent Director Andy Rachman Alamsyah' Both were
sentenced to eightyears jail by the South Jakarta District Court inApril 2006.
' InApril 2006 the public was shocked at seeing a comrption suspect throw a shoe at
his prosecutors in court. He apparently had been disappointed by the prosecutors
since despite a bribe of Rp 600 grillion paid to the prosecutors, they still prosecuted
him severely. In addition, a prosecutor who was appointed to handle the BLBI case
admitt€d in March 2008 to taking bribes; he was seized by KPK when receiving a
bribe of $600,000 from someone who was purportedly the crony of one of those
convicted in the BLBI case (Kompas, 03/03/2008).
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2 Namely the Dakab foundation, Dhan'ais foundation, Dana Sejahtera Mandiri
foundation, Trikora foundation, Amal Bhakti Muslim pancasila fouidation, Gotong
Royong Kemanusiaan foundation, and Supcrsemar foundation.
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to provide cash for the officers in exchange for easing
punishment.
Secondly, despite democrarizarion and freedom of the press,
the judicial agencies maintain secrecy regarding the progress of
cases. Police and prosecutors in particular have been very
conscientious in disallowing the public to access information on
comrprion cases. The lack of transparency on the progress of cases
has raised public allegations that the agencies cooperare illicitly
with suspects of comrption for un derhanded deals. In line with this,
and despite the huge number of reports of comrption from the
people to the judicial inscitutions, many cases are either not tackled
or intentionally delayed; and of rhe few cases being rackred, even
fewer are brought to court and concluded." The problem becomes
even worse when it is realjzed that there are so many alleged
escapees that cannot be recapEured. Transparency International
Indonesia (TII) acrimoniously criticized the LawAgencies by saying
that the agencies were far less nimbre rhan journalists who courd
interview the fugirive comrprion figures in'live'TVprograms (TII
2006: l).
Thirdly, sound coordination between law enforcement
agencies is simply scarce. This is shown by the circular process of
comrption investigations in which 'many cases had to go to-and-
from the police, then to artorneys and vice versa' (ICW 200g: lg).
This weak coordination refers nor only to handling of cormption
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shown a sincere effort to develop a cornmon platform or conduct
regular meetings to coordinate their actions. Rather, they often
blame on the legal system as the causal factor. on one occasion
Attorney-General MA Rahman, for example, stated that the poor
coordination on corruption eradication amonglaw instifutions was
due to some defects in Indonesia's Criminal Code GUHAP)'
According to him, the code contains significant faults in the
framework and procedure of law enforcement, mainly in terms of
segmentation of law agencies that leads to a lack of synergy in
handling com:ption cases (Sinar Harapan, ll/I0/2004)'
The poor judicial function is also due to limited resources
including budgets, capable employees, and equipment (see Police
predicament below). Not surprisingly, there is a general suspicion
that the juficial officers exercise investigations of comrption cases
ro fill their pockets. They rreat law as a commodiry ffade, which is
sold for as much as possible for the interests of individuals and law
enforcement instirudons. While the public and the media are
actively campaigning against cornrption, the prosecutors andjudges
cake advantage of rhe campaisn by utilizing the law for private
benefit (Palmier 2006: 156).
Policeprqdicaments
The poor performance of the police, according to the World
Bank(2003a:85):
'It is estimated that the government budget only covers
around 30o/o of actual expenditure on the police. The police
force needs to search for the rest of the budget from a variery
of extra budget revenue, including business operations,
contributions from the private sector,'operational
" In 2006 for example, although comption cases that were reported bv csoelements may reach hundreds, only r24 cases that c""ro u" """-i""i'*Ji*ilri""a,and even sadly, from this numb_er, as many as 39 cases with r 16 defendants aro lfreed by the court and only g5 cases 6b.su"1eventualry led to conviction (tcw
19991'"y* -ore, the penatties for cases of co..uptiorrt# "v"n;ilr;;;;;;;; ".gulrry wer€ consldered by many cornmentators as being too soft and not providing a
1!o-ng enough deterrent effect.for corrupt figures. Mist of the ";r";i5t;;;; ".29.SYQcariedsentences of'nder2 years impiisonment,32 cases 1zs.az") seniencesbetween2 to 5 yearsjail, and l6 c^"u 1t z.rzi *"ntcnccs ofover 5 years (ICW2006).
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cooperation," grants and police-run foundations. This begins
with new entrants to the police force who must ..buy. their
positions. As wirh other positions in government, this
continues throughout a police officer's career, with training,
promotions, and rransfers, particularly to .bet" or "dry.
positions (referring to the oppornrnities such positions
confer on the individual for cornrption) and naining all
subject ro internal levies. There are few hard facts and figures
on rhe exrenr to which dilferent off budget caregories
contribute to rhe police budget, and rherefore, it is difficult to
estimate the total cost of police operations. It is safe to
assume that rfre police itself do not know. The police,s
business operations are an increasing source of concern.
There is significant anecdotal evidence, ranging from the
buy*g of influence, exrortion and benefits from the rigid
handling of crime procedures, to direct involvement in
crimes'.
I-ack of parliamentary supervision
The state's failure to combat cormption is also due to the
parliament's lack of supervision. Despite possessing significant
power in the new political configuration noted in the previous
chapter, the Indonesian parliament has not been able to effectively
hold the government to account. In fact, the possession of
fiscretionary power often simply means an opporcunity for
committing abuses. since monitoring from their consdruents is
generally still weak, many DpR members dare to use their
discretionary power as a tool of crimc; they receir,rd bribery in
exchange ofdecision that favors thc l:ribcrs.
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public ridicule concerning their policies and behavior that did not
satisfy the people in dealing with cormption. Many parliamentary
members have even been suspected of being involved in cornrption
scandals, a situafion which street demonstrators and comefitms use
to mockingly refer to the DPR with acronyms such as'Dcvtan
Prampok Rakyat' (People Robbers Council), 'Datan Poryhhianat
Ralay at' (People Traitor's Council) and'Da't anP ecitaktpiah' (Rupiah
Lover'sCouncil).
Given the fact that so many members of the DPR were arrested
by the KPK, as noted in the previous chapter, anti-comrption
measures are often opposed by the legislarure.'o The law makers in
the DpR also attempted to complicate the procedure of prosecution
against the DPR andregional council (DPRD) members suspected of
being involved in cormption. For example, they set up 'immunity
rights for elected officials at the national and local level' when they
foimulated several laws.tt Under these laws, an attempt to
invesrigate elected officials required approval from the Fresident for
DPR members and Governors, from rhe Ministry of Home Affairs for
Regents/\4ayors and DPRD members.
Moreover, following the fall of the New Order government, all
political parties in Indonesia have tended to seek a share in the spoils
of executive office, andhavefailedto develop a distincrion berween
the parties that support and oPpose the government (Eldridge 2005:
t For example, the 'working committee on the Lal' Enforcement and Regional
Gove,mmentiprotested againit legal process of menibers of the DPR and DPRD
suspected of 6eing involied in comtption. In a recommendation presented in the
DPil session on 0i October 2006, the committee pointed out that the legal process
was an efrort to criminalise politicians and asked the President to rehabilitate the
'!ood name' of parliament memb€rs and protect the rights of those suspected of
comrption (Suara Merdek4 04/1 0 12006).
"t Suchasiawno.4/1999(revisedbyl-aw22/2003)ontheStructureandPositionof
me.mbers of MPR, DP& and DPRD, as well as Law no.2211999 (revised by Law
721 2gg+) on'Decentralisation.
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155). I'his is'*t surprising since, other rhan Goll<ar, political
pafiies have never had rhr: opportuniry co holdp'wer. So, being the
mlingparry is a comrnon dreamforeverypoliticalparry. Againsr rhis
backdrop, politicai coalitions rend to be firrmed cl' the basis of cleals
fbr attal'ing po\4,er rather than on ideologies for imprementing
pnlicy. The coalirions accorclingly change from time to rime, lvhich
makes it more dilficult for the public to disti.ngrish rhe positions of
political parties o' rhe corrupr,ion issue (world Bank 2002: 57).
Besides, prosecution of national lvlps can upset unstable coalitions
rvithin the DPR, porentially crearing blockages in che ciecision-
making pr:ocess and causing major problems for govermnents. This
is apparent, f,rr exanrplc, in the case of the corruption alegation
againsr Golkar leadcr Akbar Tandjung, which involved an
arn-biguous r:esolution.
Constrainrs on the KPK
From a theoreticai framework, the existence of extra supervisory
institutions such as the Anti-cormptiorr commission is crucial to
ensure the accountatrility of public insritutions and officials and
prevent themfrorn [ransgressing the rule of law (tINDp 2005).
Indeed, the establishment of rhe Corn_rption Erafication
commissisn (KPK) on 27 December 2002 marked a significant step
for Indonesia in cornbating cormption. The r:rg4anization has been
given significant powers and has a relatively well-selected
independent boarcl of comnrissioners." The KpK horcrs a number of
relatively eflective investigatir.e authorities such as to conduct
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wiretapping and recording, to forbid accused persons to rravel
overseas, and to order banks and other insdrudons to submit
financial statements of someone under investigation.'n The KPK even
has the right to take over the investigation and prosecution of
comrption cases from the police and the prosecutor that took place
prior to the establishment of the KPK.30 Enhanced by the creation of
the Special Court for Cormption (SCC), the KPK has been
somewhat successfrrl in convicting senior goverlrment officials at the
national and local levels. In short, the establishment of KPK has not
only renewed the anti-cormption effort, but also given confidence to
the public in a more promising battle against cormption
(Widjoyanto 2006 : xvii)
Given that KPK has just been newly established, however, its
capacity is still limited to deal with the rampant corruption during
democratization era. So far, it has been reported that KPK has been
able to conclude less than only 5% of cases reported to the agency
(Koran Sindo, 05/0V2008). The large proportion of com:ption cases
have not been handled, especially those involving military and
" Article 12 of Law 30/2002 on KPK maintains that (1) When carrying duty of
investigation, examination, and prosecution as determined by article 6 point c, KPK
has authorities: (a) to tap and record conversations; (b) to order any authorized
institution to ban someone from travelling to overseas; (c) to request financial
statement frombanks or other institutions conceming suspects under investigation;
(d) to order bank or other financial institutions for blocking any bank account that
allegedly have a link with suspects or other relate&persons; (e) to order the
srryervisor of suspects for temporarily dismissing the suspects from his/herjob; (f) to
request data ofsuspects' wealth and taxation from any institution; (g) to suspend any
financial transaction, trade, license, and concession belong to comrption suspects;
(h) torequestlnt€rpol andother State agencies forhunting and detaining suspects.
\' Article 68 of Law 3D/20fl2 on the KPK maintains that 'all the process of
investigations, exeminations, and prosecutions of comrption criminal acts that have
not bee,n finalized on the time of the establishment of KPK could be taken over by
KPK'.
" The members of KPK are selected through a mechanism that brings about checks
and balances between the executive and lcgisl'tivc. The proceis begins witl
nomination of l0 candidates try a commitlcc lbnrrcd by the presiclent. then ttre ppR
selects 5 out ofthe l0 candidates following a'fit and propcr tcst'. The president then
ratifies and inaugurates the selected commissioncrs.
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judiciary personnel. The limired performance of KpK can also
be pro'enbythe results of its workthat have onlyrecovered.losses to
the country's cash to Rp 50.04 billion, while the budget expenses of
the commission in 2004-2006 was around Rp 242.6g billion
(Antaranews, 01/08/2002). Under such conditions, KpK was
considered to have failed by some obseners in running the
magnitudc of rhe mission.
An evaluation of rhe Commission in 2004-2002 conducted by
ICW (2008), found rhat the performance of KpK is undermined.by a
number of iirnitations. Firstly, KPK tends to be too bureaucratic and
takes a long time to respond and provide feedback to reporrs of
corruption allegarions. Secondly, KPK has never processed reports
of corruption cases thar were allegedly commitrecl by prosecutors
and police. This is not a surprise, because the two commissionaires
of KPK represent the police and prosecutor instirutions, making
rhem psychologically unable ro 'irritare' rheir own insriturions and
counterparts. In addirion, KPK has been proven unable to supervise
and follow up to take over cases from the police and prosecutors.
Thirdly, the KPK darabase is insufficienr to cover rhe massive
records of public officials. Fourthly, KpK tends ro prioritize rheir
handling of cases rhar arrract public arrenrion, while cases that do
not impact on rhe populariry of KpK are less prioritized. Fifrhly,
while KPK s invesrigarors generally seem srill ro underperform, yer
there is no visible efforr ro improve their capacity. Sixthly,
accessibility is weak, due ro ics office being positioned in Jakarta;
thus the KPK is unable to effecrively reachlocal cases. Although rhis
conclusion may need further examination, che findings are agreed
upon by many CSO acrivisrs. In a workshop paper on the evaluation
of anti-corruption movements, a cso activist pointed out anecdotal
evidence concerning the general impression that KpKs performance
isunsatisfactory. Theviewof CSOs rhus roughlymeers the ICW,s
a4
findings. The activist, further, underlined that there is a general
irnpression among cso activists that 'entering the KPK office is
more like submitting a cooperation proposal rather than being
greeted as mutual parEner' whereby KPK often puts the onus on
reporters of comrption to provide proof rather than rrying to
discovermore evidence (Sinlaeloe 2007: 5).
Concludingcomments
This chapter has illusrrated that Indonesian state agencies are
generally characterized by deficiencies that Prevent them from
effecrively resEraidng corruprion. simply speaking, each branch of
ti.e government, whether executive, juficative or legislative, is
tainted by the practice of cormption. Whatever policy, strategy or
method they employ does not produce any substantial outcome'
what is produced !s a stare of ambiguiry, with formal accountability
mechanisms onlyworkingin appearance. Charges of cormption are
made, but these charges tend to be used as political ammunition
rather than for genuine law enforcement. As a consequence, anti-
cornrption initiatives have produced disappoinring results; overall,
the state has beenineffecEive to overcome theproblem'
There is no panacea for improving these circumstances in a
short rime, because conupt elites exist at every branch of the
governmenr. Given that the elites are reluctant to uphold genuine
accountabi]ity and serious anfi-comrption measures which may
endanger their interests, it is likdy that comrptionwillconginue for
a long period" only wirh outside pressure will the elites become
judicious in directing their power and authbrity' As such, the
bottom up demand for accountabiliry of the government needs to be
approachedvigilandy.
The questionis,who canimprove the siruadon? Assistance
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and pressure from the international communiry may play a
significant role. But their actions and effects are limited. Ultimately,
it is only the civil society in Lndonesia that can make a substantial
difference in dealing with cormption. It is important to note that
many cases have gone to trial and some powerful political figures
have been cclnvicted. This outcome, however, is not the exclusive
achievement of the state. As will be explained in more detail in next
chapter, most of these convictions have been made after significant
contributions from CSOs. For genuine democratization driven by
the people, efforts to combat corruption should be a bottom-up
rather than a top-down process. Civil society actors in Indonesia
have indeed stepped forward to combat corruption and work as
catalysts for accelerating democratkation., both by encouraging
checks and balances between state institutions as well as by
mobilizing and educating people to pursue their rights and
obligations inholdingthe elite to account.
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